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1 
SYMPOSIUM 
LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CROWDWASHING 
IN THE GIG ECONOMY 
MIRIAM A. CHERRY* 
INTRODUCTION 
Within this Article, I elaborate on the term “crowdwashing,” a neologism. 
Even though many online platforms describe themselves as “communities” that 
are part of the “sharing economy,” this “sharing” terminology is largely a 
misnomer when describing the activities of larger commercialized on-demand 
platforms.1 Rather than referring to volunteer efforts for collective benefit, many 
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 1. There is certainly more analysis to be done on market segmentation in the on-demand 
economy, where both small cooperative businesses and large companies with high market 
capitalization and global reach coexist. See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblatt, The Taking Economy: 
Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1625 (2017) (“Sharing economy 
rhetoric tends to lump together small enterprises motivated by a common social bond, such as local 
food and housing cooperatives, with billion-dollar global businesses like Uber and Airbnb that 
readily integrate the language of sharing and connectivity into their branding. . . . We, however, 
draw a distinction between the variety of businesses the rhetoric of the sharing economy evokes, 
like selling grandma’s pies on the corner, and the billion-dollar companies that operate for profit at 
a global scale.”). As will be set out later in this Article, the conflation of these two types of 
businesses is likely not a mistake; as some amount of the confusion may be based on clever 
language or evasion. For a discussion of how the sharing economy is a misnomer because 
participants are actively trying to make money, see Giana M. Eckhardt & Fleura Bardhi, The 
Sharing Economy Isn’t about Sharing at All, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 28, 2015), https://hbr.org/ 
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references to “sharing” in the “sharing economy” refer to the concept of 
commodification of previously underutilized assets.2 For example, consider 
receiving money for the rental of a spare bedroom through AirBnB or the sale 
of small, previously unproductive periods of time to complete tasks on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. In these examples, what is “shared” is the 
previously unproductive asset or wasted time, and then technology is used to 
value and monetize that asset.3 There is nothing of altruism in this. 
Even though describing something vastly different from what most people 
believe actual “sharing” to mean, the term “sharing economy” has provided a 
halo effect for platforms, even though some platforms engage in hyper-
commodification.4 Unfortunately, the language of “sharing” serves to cover up 
many of the problematic labor practices that are a common experience of many 
crowdworkers today.5 In this context, the terminology of sharing has moved 
from reality to what might be, at best, empty rhetoric,6 and, at worst, a strategy 
 
2015/01/the-sharing-economy-isnt-about-sharing-at-all [https://perma.cc/BHR9-NR44]. See also 
Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1406-1408 (2016). 
 2. See Matthew Yglesias, There is No Sharing Economy, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Dec. 26, 2013, 
10:02 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/12/26/myth_of_the_sharing_economy_ 
there_s_no_such_thing.html?via=gdpr-consent [https://perma.cc/32SX-LKF3] (arguing that the 
term “sharing economy” is “a dumb term, and it deserves to die.”). 
 3. See Eckhardt & Bardhi, supra note 1, at 2 (“Sharing is a form of social exchange that takes 
place among people known to each other, without any profit. Sharing is an established practice, and 
dominates particular aspects of our life, such as within the family. By sharing and collectively 
consuming the household space of the home, family members establish a communal identity. When 
“sharing” is market-mediated — when a company is an intermediary between consumers who don’t 
know each other — it is no longer sharing at all. Rather, consumers are paying to access someone 
else’s goods or services for a particular period of time. It is an economic exchange, and consumers 
are after utilitarian, rather than social, value.”). 
 4. See generally PHIL ROSENZWEIG, THE HALO EFFECT . . . AND THE EIGHT OTHER 
BUSINESS DELUSIONS THAT DECEIVE MANAGERS (2007). 
 5. The terminology seems to be working, at least among the general public. For example, a 
research study by the Pew Foundation found that 40% of those surveyed focused on “sharing” 
rather than “economy.” Aaron Smith, How Americans Define the Sharing Economy, PEW RES. CTR. 
(May 20, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/20/how-americans-define-the-
sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/4QSK-WLL8]. See also PWC, THE SHARING ECONOMY: 
CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES 9 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/entertainment-
media/publications/consumer-intelligence-series/assets/pwc-cis-sharing-economy.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/6AT5-Z2YT] (reporting that 76% of adults responding to survey thought the sharing 
economy was good for the environment). 
 6. For more on the rhetoric of the “sharing economy,” see Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the 
Sharing Economy and Its Implications for Regulating Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. 197, 199 (2017) 
(noting that sharing economy companies “convince communities, regulators, and courts that they 
are facilitating altruistic activities that utilize excess capacity, support job growth, and alter how 
we consume. This myth helps these Platforms avoid everything from employment laws . . . to 
liability for consumer harm . . . .”). In the article, Professor Stemler argues that both rhetoric and 
framing have been used to advance the cause of platform exceptionalism, and that consumers who 
become users are then enlisted to advocate for light regulation of these platforms. 
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used to evade minimum regulatory standards in the areas of tax, tort liability, 
and labor and employment law.7 Indeed, the “sharing” doublespeak has been so 
effective that it took years for many to recognize that there was a labor and 
employment problem with the work structures created by the platforms.8 And it 
is not just the platforms themselves that have been misnamed. Platforms refer to 
their workers as “Ninjas,” “Turkers,” “Rabbits,” “Taskers,” and even, perhaps 
most pathetically, “Friends”— almost any term will do, except “employees.”9 
Indeed, as set out below, an entire alternate vocabulary of terms including 
“onboarding” and “deactivation” are standing in for labor and employment legal 
terms like “hiring” and “firing.” And this artful terminology is being used to 
cover up abusive labor practices.10 
Unfortunately for many workers, the promises of the “sharing” economy 
have largely been revealed to be illusory. Indeed, in jurisdictions around the 
world, workers have sued platforms for denial of minimum wages or other 
benefits they would be entitled to under traditional labor and employment law.11 
Many commentators have criticized working conditions in the gig economy for 
the failure to comply with basic labor standards.12 Yet these problematic labor 
practices are often obscured by the rhetoric of “sharing,” the workers are often 
invisible behind the digital façade of the platform, and their concerns go 
unrecognized by a legal system that seems to place online work on a lesser 
footing than its equivalent in the real world. 13 It is this disconnect between 
rhetoric and reality, and the consequent propensity for deception accompanying 
 
 7. Id. at 199. The present treatment engages only with the labor and employment law aspects. 
Although tax law and liability law are important aspects, they are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 8. Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077, 1093–94 (2009). At the time the article was 
published, the author had difficulty persuading people that work completed on the Internet actually 
was work, rather than just a computer game or an activity undertaken as a hobby or leisure. 
 9. However, the test for employee status depends less on the terms that are used and instead, 
the substances of the relationship. See generally Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The 
Digital Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 582–83 (2016). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. For a listing of the ongoing litigation surrounding the on-demand economy in the U.S., 
see Cherry, supra note 9, at 584–85, and for further discussion of such litigation, see Valerio De 
Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On Demand Work, Crowd Work and Labor 
Protection in the “Gig-Economy”, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 489 (2016). 
 12. See, e.g., JEREMIAS PRASSL, HUMANS AS A SERVICE 51–52 (2018); Antonio Aloisi, 
Commoditized Workers, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 653, 654–655 (2016); De Stefano, supra 
note 11, at 471; Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 130–142 (2016); 
Brishen Rodgers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 98–101 (2015). 
 13. Miriam A. Cherry, Virtual Work and Invisible Labor, in INVISIBLE LABOR: HIDDEN 
WORK IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 71 (Marion Crain, Winifred Poster & Miriam Cherry, eds. 
2016). 
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it, which prompts the need for a fuller discussion of what I am terming 
“crowdwashing.”14 
This analysis of crowdwashing will amalgamate two lines of my ongoing 
research: technology and work, and corporate social responsibility and 
greenwashing. A roadmap follows. The first section draws on other types of 
“washes,” such as whitewashing, greenwashing, and pinkwashing as precedent 
for the term “crowdwashing.” The second section covers the roots of platform 
business models to examine how the term “sharing economy” and similar terms 
entered our lexicon. Section three will discuss how this type of doublespeak 
came to dominate the discourse of online platforms and how that language has 
been used to obscure real problems and gaps in the regulatory structures. Finally, 
the last section envisions what the platform economy would look like if we had 
robust corporate social responsibility practices and a set of basic protections for 
online workers. The goal is parity of treatment between online and offline 
workers. Ultimately, I argue that it is important to concentrate on re-imagining 
and re-inventing the on-demand economy to address regulatory deficits and 
leave behind the empty and misleading jargon and “sharing” rhetoric that has 
failed to serve us well. 
I.  ON “WASHING” 
The neologism “crowdwashing” is derived from the term greenwashing.15 
As for the choice of term, I chose crowdwashing for a few reasons.16 First, 
“crowdwashing” is more memorable than the term “sharewashing.” The word 
“crowd” evokes the idea of many physical people standing together. Crowds are 
often noisy, dirty, and chaotic.17 People generally tend to avoid situations where 
there is a large crowd, sometimes to such an extreme that it becomes an irrational 
fear.18 The idea of “washing” an entire crowd is one that is “sticky,” i.e. it will 
 
 14. See Alex Hern, Why the Term ‘Sharing Economy’ Needs to Die, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 
2015, 4:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/05/why-the-term-sharing-
economy-needs-to-die [https://perma.cc/QWR2-GM9T]. 
 15. This section draws on my earlier work on greenwashing. See Miriam A. Cherry, The Law 
and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 
281, 284–287 (2014); Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate 
Social Responsibility after the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 985–987 (2011). 
 16. Journalist Anthony Kalamar preceptively used the term “sharewashing” to describe the 
phenomenon all the way back in 2013. See Anthony Kalamar, Sharewashing is the New 
Greenwashing, OPEDNEWS (May 13, 2013, 6:10 PM), https://www.opednews.com/articles/Share 
washing-is-the-New-Gr-by-Anthony-Kalamar-130513-834.html [https://perma.cc/BR9S-T69P]. 
 17. See generally THOMAS HARDY, FAR FROM THE MADDING CROWD (1874); CHARLES 
MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (2d. ed. 1852). 
But see JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 3 (2004). 
 18. See Agoraphobia, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/condi 
tions/agoraphobia [https://perma.cc/X6RB-UGXV]. 
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stay in the minds of people trying to describe this phenomenon. Second, the term 
crowdwashing avoids the problem of using the disputed word “share.”19  
Crowdwashing owes a debt to the previously articulated concept of 
greenwashing in the environmental and corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) 
context. As noted in my previous work, greenwashing is one of the most 
significant challenges to achieving CSR in business today.20 Greenwashing 
involves a corporation increasing its sales or boosting its brand image through 
environmental rhetoric or advertising, but in reality not making good on those 
environmental claims.21 A firm can increase its reputation legitimately, by 
investing in sustainable practices or engaging in CSR with its emphasis on the 
triple bottom line, that is, people, profit, planet. Some firms, however, have 
responded to CSR by cultivating a green image without evidencing commitment 
to sustainability.22  
While apocryphal, many trace the origin of the term “greenwashing” to a 
1986 essay by American environmentalist who wrote about a sign he saw during 
a stay in a hotel.23 The sign urged patrons to use fewer towels during their stay 
in order to reduce environmental impact.24 The author, however, claimed that 
the real purpose of the sign was to increase hotel profits by saving on the labor 
costs of washing and changing the linens.25 As such, the sign evidenced 
deception—environmental concerns were being falsely enlisted for profits. 
Instead of “whitewashing,” that is, using white paint to cover over dirt in a 
shallow or transparent way, the essay coined the colorful term “greenwashing.” 
 
 19. See Kalamar, supra note 16. My contention is that it is confusing to include the disputed 
term in the new term, so “sharewashing” only compounds the problems by endorsing the disputed 
term “share” or “sharing.” 
 20. See Cherry, supra note 15, at 284. Note that the next part of the Article draws on this 
previous work. 
 21. See Tom Wright, False “Green” Ads Draw Global Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2008, 
11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120163622342426091 [https://perma.cc/6H8P-7C 
TW]. But see Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing 
Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 796 (2007) (making the provocative and 
interesting argument, based on psychological research, that corporations are more likely to buy in 
to CSR philosophies the more CSR rhetoric is repeated). 
 22. See Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 15, at 1015. 
 23. See Alice Rawsthorn, The Toxic Side of Being, Literally, Green, N.Y. TIMES (April 4, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/arts/05iht-design5.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=jay%20 
westerveld&st=cse [https://perma.cc/7DHU-HTEU] (referring to a 1986 Jay Westerveld essay as 
the origin of term “greenwashing”). While extensive Internet and database searching revealed many 
secondary references to the Westerveld essay as the genesis of the term, there are no definitive 
citations provided for the essay. Nor is the Westerveld essay available online. The author sent 
several emails to an email address associated with Westerveld to confirm a citation, but no reply 
has been received as of the date of this writing. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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The term stuck and “greenwashing” came to be used to signify misleading 
claims about environmental impact.26  
The precursor term “whitewashing” is also useful for our purposes of 
thinking about crowdwashing and labor practices in the on-demand economy. In 
2013, Professor Lesley Wexler generally explored legal definitions of the term 
“whitewashing.”27 The context for her discussion was the labor and employment 
practices and gender discrimination lawsuits against WalMart. Wexler’s article 
set forth a useful, and broader, definitional rubric for whitewashing.28 As noted 
there, “whitewashing refers to the practice of using low-cost calcium paint to 
superficially conceal or cover up a structural or substantive defect. Although the 
painter knows of its problems, a whitewashed wall appears flawless to the 
untrained eye.”29 Wexler goes on to explain that the essential components of a 
whitewash are: “an underlying defect, an attempt to conceal the defect by 
diverting attention, and a failure to fix the underlying defect.”30 Finally, Wexler 
includes elements of a whitewash that include: “(1) a wrongdoer’s (2) 
deployment and publicity of policies and practices (3) in response to the 
identification of a legal grievance, (4) which does not address the underlying 
concern of the aggrieved and (5) is intended to establish, maintain, burnish, or 
restore institutional reputation.”31 Another way to think of the concept of a 
“wash” is that it is intended as a diversionary tactic from the real harm that is 
actually being done.  
 
 26. While there is no common definition of greenwashing per se, Terra Choice attempted to 
classify the “Seven Sins of Greenwashing.” THE SINS OF GREENWASHING: HOME AND FAMILY 
EDITION, http://sinsofgreenwashing.com/findings/the-seven-sins/index.html [https://perma.cc/R2 
LA-JUZL] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). The more straightforward and obvious sins include: no proof; 
vagueness; fibbing; and worshipping false labels (fake endorsements). While these sins seem clear, 
the other forms of greenwashing are more complicated, yet just as potentially misleading. For 
example, in the sin of “hidden tradeoffs,” a product is defined as green based on one attribute, but 
there may have been other environmental factors at play that make the product less than optimal 
for the environment. A packaging claim may also commit the “sin of irrelevance,” touting a factor 
(such as no CFCs) when there is already a legal rule in place banning it. While not an outright lie, 
per se, such product marketing may be designed to over-state a product’s green nature and may 
ultimately misled consumers. Finally, the sin of “lesser of two evils” tries to minimize the harm 
done by the category of goods overall. So, for example, a greenwashing company might tout the 
fuel-saving benefits of its hybrid SUVs even though hybrid SUVs overall consume more gas than 
smaller non-hybrid cars. The categorization of these sins is useful in trying to analyze an overall 
definition of greenwashing. 
 27. Lesley Wexler, Extralegal Whitewashes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 818–820 (2013). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 825. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 825–26. 
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Although Wexler’s article discusses elements, whitewashing, 
greenwashing, and pinkwashing32 currently are not legally actionable as torts in 
and of themselves, per se. While these activities certainly seem dishonest, that 
alone would not give rise to a legal cause of action. It is true that some 
greenwashes have resulted in liability for false advertising.33 For example, there 
have been successful cases for false advertising around product labeling where 
insecticide companies that labeled their products as “ozone friendly” or 
“environmentally safe,” when that statement was untrue.34 In addition, cases 
have also been brought based on the use of the words “recycled,” “recyclable,” 
or “biodegradable,” all which now have solid legal definitions.35 However, the 
rhetoric of being a responsible company or just a general description of good 
business practices could be too vague a statement to create a cause of action for 
false advertising.36 Some commentators have floated the idea of securities 
regulation liability for fake promises of corporate social responsibility.37 
 
 32. A “pink wash” refers to either a wash that extols fake friendliness to the LGBTIA 
community, or a use of the breast cancer ribbon to sell products that do not actually assist cancer 
research. See generally About Us, THINK BEFORE YOU PINK, http://thinkbeforeyoupink.org/about-
us/ [https://perma.cc/5RXN-FSHF] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018); Stephan Dahl, The Rise of Pride 
Marketing and the Curse of ‘Pink Washing’, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 26, 2014, 10:34 AM), 
http://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-pride-marketing-and-the-curse-of-pink-washing-30925 
[https://perma.cc/V7W7-SGYH]. 
 33. See John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the 
Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 301–304 (1994) (citing cases on false 
advertising). 
 34. Douglass M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 646 (2001). See also Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of 
Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 603, 617–19 (2000). 
 35. See Church, supra note 33, at 301–07. 
 36. One of the leading cases on greenwashing is Nike v. Kasky which examines the issue in 
the context of free speech and the First Amendment. Scholars have published much commentary 
about the case and its impact. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. 
Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1049–1051 (2004); Tamara R. Piety, 
Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s Quest for a Constitutional Right to Lie, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 151, 
151–62 (2004); Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-But-Going-Nowhere 
Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y, 383 (2005); Robert L. Kerr, From Sullivan to 
Nike: Will the Noble Purpose of the Landmark Free Speech Case Be Subverted to Immunize False 
Advertising, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 525 (2004); Michele Sutton, Note, Between a Rock and a 
Judicial Hard Place: CSR Reporting and Potential Legal Liability Under Kasky v. Nike, 72 UMKC 
L. REV. 1159, 1169–70 (2004). 
 37. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1293-306 (1999) (proposing that SEC mandate disclosure 
of environmental information, thus providing a check against inflated advertising claims); David 
Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges of Social 
and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 151–58 (2004); Janet E. Kerr, The 
Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 
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Based on these precursors, we can work toward defining the elements of a 
crowdwash. The first step element is to find an underlying flaw, claim, or 
grievance that is being covered up. In crowdwashing, this underlying flaw is the 
failure of some platforms to comply with minimum labor standards. This lack of 
compliance has been documented and elaborated upon by other commentators.38 
Journalists and labor activists have either worked online39 or interviewed those 
working online in computer crowdwork, and determined that workers were 
unable to earn minimum wage.40 The gigs were precarious; the time spent 
looking for work is not counted, even though it is certainly work itself, and there 
are no benefits.41 To use the terms employed by sociologists, these are “bad 
jobs,” with no opportunity for benefits, training, or career advancement.42 
Having aggrieved claimants, however, is only the first part of the “wash.” 
The second part involves covering up the problem and instead, telling a story 
that in fact burnishes or improves the reputation of the company. Here, we can 
look to the language of “sharing” as the rhetorical device that covers up many 
of these problems and simultaneously tells a story of altruism. Platform 
companies also have used framing devices to cover up their responsibility to 
workers. In part, platforms argue that because they are technology companies, 
message boards, market makers, or something else other than employers, they 
should not have to comply with labor and employment laws.43 To understand 
crowdwashing more fully, it is necessary to look at some of these language and 
rhetorical strategies. 
 
81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 831–34 (2008); Janet E. Kerr, A New Era of Responsibility: A Modern 
American Mandate for CSR, 78 UMKC L. REV. 327, 358–61 (2009). 
 38. See, e.g., Prassl, supra note 12, at 68–70; Aloisi, supra note 12, at 675–78; De Stefano, 
supra note 11, at 489–94. 
 39. See Miranda Katz, Amazon’s Turker Crowd Has Had Enough, WIRED (Aug. 23, 2017, 
6:55 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/amazons-turker-crowd-has-had-enough/ [https://perma. 
cc/JGG6-99CT]. 
 40. Moshe Z. Marvit, How Crowdworkers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine, THE 
NATION (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-crowdworkers-became-ghosts-
digital-machine/ [https://perma.cc/2KAH-LR95]; Robert Booth, 700,000 Gig Workers Paid Below 
National Minimum Wage, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2018, 9:19 AM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/business/2018/feb/07/death-dpd-courier-don-lane-tragedy-business-secretary [https://perma. 
cc/37E7-2VZU]; Alana Semuels, The Internet Is Enabling a New Kind of Poorly Paid Hell, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/01/amazon-me 
chanical-turk/551192/ [https://perma.cc/P46P-CNL8]. 
 41. Marvit, supra note 40; Booth, supra note 40; Semuels, supra note 40. 
 42. See generally Arne L. Kalleberg, Barbara F. Reskin & Ken Hudson, Bad Jobs in America: 
Standard and Nonstandard Employment Relations and Job Quality in United States, 65 AM. SOC. 
REV. 256 (2000). 
 43. Stemler, supra note 6, at 199. 
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II.  THE LANGUAGE OF “SHARING” 
Having discussed some preliminary and definitional issues around 
crowdwashing, we can now attempt a fuller look at how the language of 
“sharing” is being deployed within the gig economy. The first part of this section 
looks to the roots of online collaboration, and how commercialized on-demand 
platforms came to be wrapped in the cloak of “sharing.” The second part 
examines some of the problematic terminology in more depth. Specifically, the 
second part examines the euphemistic names that platforms give to workers, the 
hiring process, and many other components of the relationship between worker 
and platform.  
A. The Watchamacallit Economy44 
The origins of term “sharing economy” to describe online or application-
based platform businesses are imprecise, and likely apocryphal. However, with 
some assurance, we know that that the true pooling of resources and using 
community assets to help out the common good has a long history around the 
world.45 Communities set up exchanges in different communities based on 
“barter” or timeshares, where individuals were able to bank and trade their 
time.46 Others formed clubs to invest in and trade access to specialized 
machinery or tools.47 We need look no further than the lending library to see a 
community resource dedicated to keeping communities well-informed and 
educated. On the frontier of the United States, communities would come 
together to volunteer with major construction tasks, such as raising a barn.48 All 
of these efforts depended on volunteerism and community spirit. They certainly 
pre-dated the Internet and the current controversies over “sharing.” 
In his 2005 book The Wealth of Networks, Yochai Benkler described ways 
in which the Internet was beginning to facilitate the free exchange of 
information.49 Citing operating systems like Linux and other examples of 
 
 44. The name of this section comes from an article of the same name written by journalist 
Steven Greenhouse. See Steven Greenhouse, The Whatchamacallit Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/the-whatchamacallit-economy.html 
[https://perma.cc/94LW-WNR2?type=image]. 
 45. See generally John F. Sherry Jr., Gift Giving in Anthropological Perspective, 10 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 157 (1983); Camille Robcis, Lévi-Strauss’s Structuralist Social Contract, 123 
YALE FRENCH STUD. 145 (2013). 
 46. See generally JANELLE ORSI & EMILY DOSKOW, THE SHARING SOLUTION: HOW TO SAVE 
MONEY, SIMPLIFY YOUR LIFE, AND BUILD COMMUNITY (1st ed. 2009); Jenny Kassan & Janelle 
Orsi, The LEGAL Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (2012). 
 47. See generally John W. Bennett, Reciprocal Economic Exchanges among North American 
Agricultural Operators, 24 SW. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 276 (1968). 
 48. See generally “Raising Bees” Served as Community Building Activity, ORLEANS CTY. 
DEP’T. HIST. (Nov. 2, 2017), http://orleanscountyhistorian.org/raising-bees-served-as-community-
building-activity/ [https://perma.cc/MZF6-C3DB]. 
 49. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 1–6 (2005). 
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collaborative creation like Wikipedia, Benkler noticed that many of the 
technologies that were being created were open source and that this might have 
radical implications for the Internet’s development.50 It was within this 
environment that much of the discussion of the “sharing” economy grew. 
Collaborative technologies and new business models were being tested, some to 
take hold, and others to be disregarded as the laws changed51 or they became 
outdated.  
One of the author’s earlier articles, Cyber Commodification, analyzed the 
way that new technology on the Internet was either developing as completely 
free and open access or, at the other extreme, completely commodified.52 The 
article concluded that online commodification is more of a continuum, with 
many portions of the Internet existing in states of incomplete commodification.53 
It seems that many of the ideas that started out as non-monetized or collaborative 
have at this point turned into for-profit services. Businesspeople have now had 
the time to figure how to monetize some of these earlier systems. In fact, 
technology has enabled the monetization of some items that we would not 
normally think of as financial concepts, such as friendship, or two seconds of 
someone’s time, or an individual’s predictions about the future.54 
The businesses that first sprung up around the rubric “sharing” in the first 
decade of the 2000s were also called “peer to peer” businesses or “collaborative” 
businesses. They depended on the power of the crowd, and so “collaborative” 
was an apt moniker. One such business, the T-shirt design website Threadless, 
served as the prototype for the “crowdwork” model described first by journalist 
 
 50. Id. See also Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of 
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 332–35 (2004); Yochai 
Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 386–87 
(2002). 
 51. Prediction markets using real money were largely outlawed in the United States as an 
unfortunate by-product of legislative action designed to stamp out Internet gambling. Miriam A. 
Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Prediction Markets and the First Amendment, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
833, 834–36 (2008). 
 52. Miriam A. Cherry, Cyber Commodification, 72 MD. L. REV. 381, 381–86 (2013). 
 53. Id. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 
(1987); Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: The Subject and Object of 
Commodification, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 8, 25 (Martha Ertman & Joan C. Williams 
eds., 2005) (Radin is “convinced that [her] most useful scholarly contribution is likely to be having 
made the word ‘commodification’ speakable in legal academic discourse.”). Indeed, as early as 
2002, Professor Margaret Jane Radin, a pioneer of commodification theory in legal literature, noted 
that the Internet and other computer technology was helping to accelerate various types of 
commodification by lowering transaction costs and bringing buyers and sellers together in a truly 
global marketplace. Margaret Jane Radin, Incomplete Commodification in the Computerized 
World, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 3, 4 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock 
Netanel eds., 2002). 
 54. Miriam A. Cherry & Rogers L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using Information 
Markets to Predict Supreme Court Decisions, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1145 (2006). 
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Jeff Howe.55 In that business model, the platform allowed the members to 
participate in T-shirt design, ran contests to figure out what the best and most 
desired designs were, and then sold the winning designs to the membership.56 
Such situations were deemed “prosumer,” a portmanteau of the words 
“producer” and “consumer.”57 They were participatory and, indeed, relied on 
the collective decision-making process of users.58 It is not that there were no 
platform models that were monetized or even that paid workers poorly. In fact, 
Amazon Mechanical Turk and similar services like Crowdflower did pay 
poorly.59 At the time, however, this seemed like an experiment or game, rather 
than a recognized category of workers.60 
Other on-demand platforms in this nascent space asked people to essentially 
make an inventory of their assets and make better use of them. Just like the tool 
library of old, the idea was that most people did not want ownership of a 
particular item, what they wanted was access to it.61 Journalist Matthew Yglesias 
wrote a short piece in 2013 that seemed to trace use of the “sharing” terminology 
to an advertising campaign by Zipcar, which promised access to a car for small 
periods of time in urban areas.62 As he noted in his piece, while access to a car 
 
 55. See, e.g., Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 1, 2006), 
https://www.wired.com/2006/06/crowds/ [https://perma.cc/R4Z5-V9BH] (using term 
“crowdsourcing” to describe work performed with the aid of contributions from diverse groups of 
users on the internet); Deborah Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto 
for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 929 (2009) (“Computer technology 
in the hands of the masses has made available software programs that can create music, documents, 
and art just as well as expensive studios did in the past. This democratization of technology disrupts 
the monopoly on the creative means of production. The world of amateur production also 
demonstrates that many are motivated by noncommercial reasons.”). 
 56. DAREN C. BRABHAM, CROWDSOURCING xix–xx (2013). 
 57. See generally DIGITAL LABOR AND PROSUMER CAPITALISM: THE US MATRIX (Mathieu 
O’Niel & Olivier Fraysse eds.) (2015). Note that the idea of “prosumers” is a new name but that the 
idea that customers would also be working is an older one. See, e.g., MICHAEL PALM, 
TECHNOLOGIES OF CONSUMER LABOR: A HISTORY OF SELF-SERVICE 26 (2017) (detailing history 
of consumer work in the grocery store and on the telephone). 
 58. Stemler, supra note 6 at 201 (noting that going into the 2010s, “the Sharing Economy was 
considered a social, political, and economic transformation that was democratizing how we 
produce, consume, govern, and solve social problems.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Otey v. Crowdflower, No. 12–CV–05524–JST, 2015 WL 4076620, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 
2, 2015). 
 60. Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077, 1096 (2009) (couching problem as one of 
work versus leisure because of newness of the platforms at that time). 
 61. J.J. Colao, Welcome to The New Sharing Economy: Goodbye Ownership, Hello Access, 
FORBES (Oct. 11, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/10/11/welcome-to-the-new-
millennial-economy-goodbye-ownership-hello-access/#13ca952b74ab [https://perma.cc/Y5WS-
Z5XS]. 
 62. See Yglesias, supra note 2. 
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for a small period of time may be an interesting business model, it does not seem 
to have much to do with sharing.63 As he noted there,  
My neighbor and I share a snow shovel because we share some stairs that need 
to be shoveled when it snows and we share responsibility for doing the work. If 
I owned the stairs and charged him a small fee every time he walked in or out of 
the house, that would be the opposite of sharing.64  
This was the business environment at the time that Lyft began operating in 
the Bay Area in the first decade of the 2000s. Originally the service did not ask 
riders to pay, except for what they thought was fair for gas and the driver’s 
time.65 The idea was not to replicate a taxi service, but instead for neighbors to 
assist one another. In fact, early Lyft ads talk about both the passengers and the 
drivers being “friends.”66 One of the hallmarks of the company early on was the 
“fist bump” that Lyft drivers and customers would give to each other to show 
camaraderie.67 Other early advertisement surrounding the company stressed that 
the service would be beneficial for the environment.68 Cars could be taken off 
the road, and numerous people could carpool together. The person going in one 
direction to work could now, with the aid of the Lyft platform, pick up other 
riders, start a carpool, and collect money to offset the gas and garaging expenses 
of owning a car.  
These various early models of “sharing” were still developing into the early 
2010s, when Uber captured the attention of the public and people suddenly 
became familiar with the idea of crowdwork. Rather than buy into any pretense 
of neighbors helping each other, this new set of companies openly sought market 
share and profits.69 Yet these platforms profited from the efforts of other, earlier 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Sam Gustin, Lyft: Ride Sharing Startup Zimride Hits the Gas Pedal in San Francisco, 
TIME (Sept. 4, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/09/04/need-a-lyft-ride-sharing-startup-zim 
ride-hits-the-gas-pedal/ [https://perma.cc/9GPQ-92XT]. 
 66. Ryan Lawler, Lyft Sheds Some of Its Quirks as It Seeks New Users, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 
30, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/11/30/lyft-quirks/ [https://perma.cc/X9QG-T7YM]. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Maureen Morrison, Lyft’s First Big Ad Campaign: We’re Not Just a Transportation 
Service, We Create Community, ADVERT. AGE (Jan. 27, 2015), http://adage.com/article/digital/lyft-
launches-national-campaign/296819 [https://perma.cc/L4VK-4QK3] (describing Lyft’s attempt to 
“differentiate itself by offering a combination of ‘humanity and technology,’” and providing a video 
showing a Lyft commercial set in the San Francisco Bay Area); Lyft, What Is Lyft?, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2bQdf408T8 [https://perma.cc/977Y-DE 
QM] (explaining how Lyft works and noting that you meet new friends and community members 
in using it); Lyft, Lyft Community Solutions: The Price We Pay, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhOrD-Kkt5E [https://perma.cc/QQD4-Q8W2] (noting that 
the company has increased opportunities for the disabled and those residents who live without a 
car). 
 69. Stemler, supra note 6, at 207. 
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platforms that had been more community-based.70 Indeed, many of those 
websites promoting community benefits still exist. But when certain platforms 
treat workers poorly, engage in regulatory arbitrage, and fight legal battles or 
even exit markets rather than compromise with communities, it is easy to see 
that “sharing” has become a misnomer, or in some instances, a misrepresentation 
of the true nature of what is happening.  
A. Other DoubleSpeak in the Gig Economy 
While so far the main focus has been on the use of “sharing” terminology, 
it is far from the only linguistic misrepresentation surrounding on-demand 
businesses. Additional doublespeak reveals itself in what we would normally 
think of as the creation of and the end of the work relationship in legal terms. 
Rather than being hired and going through an employee orientation, workers on 
these platforms go through a similar process, yet it is called “onboarding.”71 In 
the crowdwork context, onboarding presumably involves establishing an online 
account, some amount of learning about the company, having questions 
answered, and then being set up to work. The use of the term “onboarding,” 
however, evades the word “hiring,” which appears in many statutes in relation 
to labor rights, and it also avoids the traditional phrase “employee orientation,” 
which would imply that an activity that is related to labor and employment laws 
was occurring. Thus “onboarding” is a euphemistic evasion to describe what is 
a fairly straightforward “hiring” process. 
Similarly, an employee who was not performing well might be given 
feedback and progressive discipline, but ultimately be fired if not performing the 
quantity and quality of work expected. However, workers in the gig economy 
are not fired, rather, they are “deactivated.” 72 This impersonal terminology 
conceals a destructive truth; deactivation can actually be worse than being fired. 
The worker only discovers deactivation when they go to log into the app, and 
find that their account is erased and they are effectively banned from returning 
to the platform. This may also include erasure of data or information built up 
around the worker’s account.73 In many instances the platform may not be 
 
 70. Id. at 205–07. 
 71. See Will You Pass the Uber Background Check?, RIDESHARING DRIVER (Jan. 15, 2018), 
https://www.ridesharingdriver.com/will-you-pass-the-uber-background-check/ [https://perma.cc/ 
PX25-DT87] (informing Uber drivers of details surrounding the background checks they must 
complete before “onboarding”). 
 72. See Sydney Brownstone, Seattle Lyft Driver Wants to Know Why She Was Deactivated 
after Attending a Teamsters Organizing Meeting, THE STRANGER (Nov. 15, 2015, 11:47 AM), 
https://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/2015/11/19/23163805/seattle-lyft-driver-wants-to-know-
why-she-was-deactivated-after-attending-a-teamsters-organizing-meeting [https://perma.cc/Q3R8 
-V6V3] (detailing “deactivation” of Lyft driver who organized meeting for drivers at union office). 
 73. Fired from Uber: Why Drivers Get Deactivated, and How to Get Reactivated, 
RIDESHARING DRIVER (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.ridesharingdriver.com/fired-uber-drivers-get-
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required to give a reason for deactivation, with no appeal or recourse on the part 
of the worker.74 Deactivation can be an automatic response to user ratings falling 
below a number, as a result of algorithm management.75 
As noted above, this use of language is far from accidental. In fact, a leaked 
document from European food delivery app Foodora exposes these linguistic 
manipulations for what they clearly are – attempts to cover up or disguise the 
existence of a labor relationship.76 The leaked document provides synonyms for 
many of the terms that exist for employees and directs its managers to use those 
other terms.77 For example:  
Instead of hiring riders at a recruitment centre, for example, senior staff 
undertake “onboarding” at a “supply centre.” They must also talk about riders’ 
“availability” rather than refer to shifts. As an example, it tells staff they should 
not tell riders, “You did not attend a shift” and should instead say, “You were 
unavailable to accept orders at a previously agreed time.” Riders’ branded outfits 
must not be described as uniform, but only as “kit” or “equipment.” The 
document’s list of dos and don’ts also says that riders do not clock on, but log 
in (to the rider app), and says that staff dealing with riders pay should always 
refer to invoices rather than payslips.78 
And while all of this doublespeak about the hiring process seems extreme, the 
lengths that some platforms will go to in order not to call their workers 
“employees” involve even further legerdemain.  
Platforms refer to “Providers,” “Taskers,” “Clickers,” “Authors,” 
“Hourlies,” “Riders,” “Partners,” “Roos,” and even “Ninjas” rather than use the 
 
deactivated-and-reactivated/ [https://perma.cc/N6UX-67T8] (stating that Uber rarely actually 
states “you’re fired,” but rather says things like “Your account needs attention” or “Your account 
has been placed on hold”); Carolyn Said, Uber, Lyft Drivers Fear Getting Booted from Work, S.F. 
CHRON. (Oct. 14, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Uber-Lyft-
drivers-fear-getting-booted-from-work-13304052.php [https://perma.cc/QV4V-9YTF] (describing 
instances of workers discovering that their accounts had been deactivated). 
 74. The practice of deactivation has encountered significant enough issues that it has become 
part of the settlement negotiations in the Uber and Lyft litigations. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 
3d 930, 934 (N.D. Cal. 2016); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1117–19 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016). Under the terms of these settlement agreements, drivers would have the ability to be 
heard by a labor arbitrator before being disconnected. Cotter, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 934; O’Connor, 
201 F. Supp. 3d at 1117–19. 
 75. Uber Community Guidelines, UBER (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.uber.com/legal/commu 
nity-guidelines/us-en/ [https://perma.cc/6FR9-FRUB]. See also Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, 
Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers, 10 INT’L J. OF 
COMM. 3758, 3759 (2015). 
 76. Sarah Butler, Deliveroo Accused of ‘Creating Vocabulary’ to Avoid Calling Couriers 
Employees, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/apr/05/ 
deliveroo-couriers-employees-managers [https://perma.cc/95SB-U7G7]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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term “worker” or “employee.”79 Some of these terms for workers are cute, such 
as “Roos,” or even in the case of “Ninjas” deferential, while others of these terms 
could be seen as dehumanizing.80 So instead of hiring a worker to put together 
IKEA furniture, platform users might turn to TaskRabbit to have a “Rabbit” to 
do the work for them.81 In devising this parallel terminology, those who use a 
platform are discouraged from forming the “worker” identity, and instead called 
something else. The refusal to use the terminology that the legal system typically 
uses to discuss labor and employment law issues is troubling and may also signal 
evasion. 
I.  REIMAGINING THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY 
When Malaysian jetliner MH370 crashed in 2014, thousands of people 
around the world logged in to search the images of tiny patches of ocean to see 
if survivors or debris could be identified.82 In the years since, similar types of 
search and rescue applications have allowed volunteers to donate their time in 
an effort to save lives.83 More recently, a cellphone application called “Be My 
Eyes” connects sighted users with blind users. Blind users call when they need 
help with a task, like reading a pricetag or directions.84 The app then connects 
them with sighted users who take a video call and provide assistance with 
reading the item, all for free.85 These are two genuine examples of “sharing” 
one’s labor on the Internet through an app or platform for a socially beneficial 
cause, helping others through altruism.  
 
 79. Id. See also, e.g., Start Tasking. Earn Money Your Way, TASKRABBIT, https://www.task 
rabbit.com/become-a-tasker [https://perma.cc/7XEA-HMZN] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018); Become 
a Driver-Partner, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/3362f824-b3de-4cc3-979d-6bafcbc24290 
[https://perma.cc/RR59-UMGC] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018). 
 80. De Stefano, supra note 11, at 477–78. 
 81. Megan Rose Dickey, IKEA Has Bought TaskRabbit, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/28/ikea-buys-taskrabbit/ [https://perma.cc/LB4P-5EJU]; Ingrid 
Angulo, Ikea Rolls Out Nationwide Assembly Services with TaskRabbit, CNBC (Mar. 13, 2018, 
9:43 A.M.), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/13/ikea-rolls-out-nationwide-assembly-services-with-
taskrabbit.html [https://perma.cc/24UA-H36X]. 
 82. Carmen Fishwick, Tomnod – The Online Search Party Looking for Malaysian Airlines 
Flight MH370, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ 
mar14/tomnod-online-search-malaysian-airlines-flight-mh370 [https://perma.cc/WAM8-LT4C]. 
Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of thousands of crowdwork volunteers and many search 
efforts, the wreckage was never found. Id. 
 83. Steve Friess, 50,000 Volunteers Join Distributed Search for Steve Fossett, WIRED (Sept. 
11, 2007, 2:00 P.M.), https://www.wired.com/2007/09/50000-volunteers-join-distributed-search-
for-steve-fossett/ [https://perma.cc/6PEQ-6YC9]. 
 84. BE MY EYES, https://www.bemyeyes.com/ [https://perma.cc/D7QR-7NL7] (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2018). 
 85. Id. See generally Steve O’Hear, Be My Eyes Lets You Help a Visually-Impaired Person 
See via Their Phone’s Video Camera, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 16, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015 
/01/16/be-my-eyes/ [https://perma.cc/M7N8-HW7A]. 
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Crowdwashing puts collaborative efforts like these at risk, making 
participants cynical about being used or taken advantage of. As the journalist 
Anthony Kalamar writes, crowdwashing: 
[D]oes more than just misrepresent things like renting, working, and surveilling 
as “sharing.” It does more than just stretch and contort the meaning of the word 
“sharing” until it practically loses all meaning. It also disables the very promise 
of an economy based on sharing by stealing the very language we use to talk 
about it, turning a crucial response to our impending ecological crisis into 
another label for the very same economic logic which got us into that crisis in 
the first place.86 
Crowdwashing is thus a serious concern with implications for worker’s rights, 
but it is also serious because it might undermine online collaborative volunteer 
efforts or the environmental concerns the “sharing” economy had touted itself 
as helping to fix.  
This next section suggests three steps to reduce disingenuous 
crowdwashing. The first step is to fix the flawed “sharing” terminology. The 
second step involves making on-demand workers more visible. Here I am 
referencing existing efforts to find worker voice behind the technological 
platforms. Third, and finally, we can start to think about reimagining the type of 
platform work that we want to have for the future through various minimum 
standards. Corporate social responsibility, free of crowdwashing, can have a role 
to play in the structuring and implementation of such standards.87 
A. Changing the Terminology 
One immediate suggestion is to stop using the language of “sharing” to refer 
to the on-demand economy unless it is genuinely capturing the idea of volunteer 
work for collaborative benefit. When referring to platforms that facilitate 
volunteer work, like the Malaysian jetliner or Be My Eyes, sharing is altogether 
appropriate. Likewise, there are smaller, community based instances that could 
genuinely use the “sharing” label.  
However, given the variety of different platforms that exist, the terminology 
of “sharing” can be misleading. This is so especially when dealing with for-
profit companies involved in cyber commodification. Language matters, and 
continuing to use the misleading term of “sharing” amplifies and reinforces an 
already misunderstood labor and employment law issue. Furthermore, we should 
consider dropping other meaningless business jargon, like “ninjas” or 
“onboarding,” as these terms are being used either to disguise the workers, or 
the work in which they are engaged. The long list of substitute terminology used 
 
 86. See Kalamar, supra note 16. 
 87. See Miriam A. Cherry & Winifred R. Poster, Crowdwork, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, and Fair Labor Practices, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS 291, 299–310 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016). 
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by Deliveroo management in order to avoid liability for the employment 
relationship makes it clear that this is language that is being used to manipulate 
and deceive users of the site, the public, regulators, and possibly workers 
themselves.88  
If the language of “sharing” is problematic and contributing to a 
crowdwashing, then what language should be used instead? Instead of “sharing 
economy,” a better option would be to use the term “on-demand economy.”89 
The term “on-demand economy” describes the business model based on user 
need, and is a generally a neutral term. Further, the phrase “on-demand” signifies 
that this is an economy of efficiency and convenience. As far as its descriptive 
power, “on-demand” accurately captures the fact that the app is “always on” and 
that workers may find themselves working at various times in order to meet that 
demand. As such, “on demand” is a significantly better choice for use in 
academic articles and the popular press, rather than “sharing.” 
Another alternative is to use the phrase “gig economy.”90 In some ways, this 
is an accurate term because it captures the fact that work, or a “gig” is taking 
place. The nature of “gigs” is that they are short term, discrete, and precarious, 
and thus the term also accurately captures the concept of microtasks or odd jobs 
that could be posted on an online platform. But “gigs” also refer to musicians, 
and the term pre-dated the Internet and apps; it may actually be a broader term 
than tasks that take place due to a platform intermediary.91  
Whatever the pluses and minuses of the terms are, both “gig” and “on 
demand” more accurately describe the situation than the misleading language of 
sharing. Likewise, we should insist on using terms like “worker” and 
“employee,” no matter how cutesy or fun it sounds to hire a “Roo” or “Ninja.” 
And made-up words like “onboarding” are neither cute nor fun, and do no 
additional work than that already performed by the term “hiring,” which has a 
specific legal meaning. 
B. Making Workers More Visible 
Another strategy to counteract crowdwashing is to make the workers more 
visible. Currently, platforms hide workers from ultimate users, especially with 
crowdwork performed wholly on the computer. As noted in my chapter in 
Invisible Labor Hidden Work in the Contemporary World, technology “may hide 
workers from a Web site’s ultimate users or consumers, who . . . may not even 
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know that a human is working at all.”92 Various crowdworker and labor activists 
have attempted to change this dynamic over the years, through protests 
specifically designed to make workers more visible. 
In 2015, Stanford researchers and crowdworkers organized the Dynamo 
campaign, which was described as “a community platform designed to gather 
ideas, energy, and support directed towards collective action.”93 A primary focus 
of Dynamo was overcoming the twin issues that seemed to be stopping collective 
action in the sector, which they described as “stalling” and “friction.”94 Two of 
Dynamo’s initiatives secured significant media attention: the articulation of 
guidelines for academic researchers and a letter-writing campaign targeted at 
Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos.95  
The guidelines were aimed at academic researchers, who commonly post 
surveys, psychological tests, and other similar tasks online. Many of the tasks 
came under fire because of the low rates of pay offered. Amazon now officially 
suggests that requesters use Dynamo’s Guidelines for Academic Requesters as 
a basis “to help Requesters get started successfully with MTurk.”96 The 
guidelines include standards of identification, timeliness, and fair pay.97 As 
such, this part of the Dynamo’s effort seems to have had a lasting impact. 
The second effort that received widespread media attention was the letter-
writing campaign to Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos. Bezos was publicly known for 
his willingness to respond to Amazon customers’ emails that were sent to him.98 
Knowing about this affinity, Dynamo began a campaign to have Turkers email 
Bezos directly.99 The letter writing campaign by Turkers received extensive 
media coverage during the busy gift-giving Christmas season.100 For example, 
Kristy Milland, the community manager of the online community, Turkernation, 
wrote in her own letter to Bezos, “[p]lease stop selling us as nothing more than 
an algorithm and instead introduce those who use your service to the fact we are 
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living, breathing beings . . . .”101 To Milland, Turkers should be seen as highly-
skilled laborers and marketed as such, rather than Amazon presenting them as 
unskilled and thus enabling poor payment and attitudes by requesters.102 Thus, 
Dynamo activists sought to raise the awareness of Turkers as workers, not as 
invisible and disembodied “artificial artificial intelligence.”  
C. Toward Better Platform Work 
Crowdwashing would not be necessary if the standards and types of work 
offered, met or exceeded current labor standards. Which brings us to the 
question: what would a “good” or “socially responsible” or “sustainable” 
platform look like for workers? Regardless of the intervention of a platform, we 
know that sub-minimum wage pay, a lack of benefits, wage theft, no opportunity 
for advancement or training, and a lack of transparency are “bad jobs,” both 
offline and online.103 But rather than continuing to catalog the problems with the 
current system, how would we envision platforms that were socially responsible 
and created decent work?104  
To begin, some of the platforms might actually be run and owned by the 
workers themselves. Professors Trebor Scholz and Nathan Schneider at the New 
School have written extensively about platform cooperatives.105 The business 
model of such platform cooperatives “flip the script” on most traditional 
working relationship. Rather than work for a wage, workers, who are also 
cooperative owners, are able to keep most of the money earned from their 
platform. Only a percentage of their earnings go back to the platform, with the 
goal not that of enriching platform investors, but rather to invest in upkeep and 
functionality of the platform.106  
Even in businesses not owned by workers, we could imagine improvement 
in current employment practices. First, we should assume that such a business 
wanting to establish such norms would likely adhere to a corporate code of 
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conduct and corporate social responsibility norms.107 These would encompass 
the idea of fair remuneration, which at the very least, would reflect the minimum 
wage, but would perhaps in fact be more akin to a living wage. Disclosure and 
transparency are also important, so that workers understand the big picture of 
what they are working for and can make informed choices.108 Finally, there need 
to be procedural safeguards for workers on platforms. If there are rating systems 
that are being built up over time, then workers should be able to have access to 
that data, and also to be able to contest the data if it is wrongfully withheld.109 It 
is also important to ensure for procedural protections so that wage theft does not 
occur. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, this Article has attempted to give voice to the growing sense of 
unease the author feels when hearing the term “sharing economy” used by the 
media, academics, or within the zeitgeist. While there certainly are some online 
business models that involve collaboration and sharing, others have no such 
motivation. Rather, these platforms look, if anything, even more commodified 
than their equivalents in the offline world. If that is accurate, then it seems 
disingenuous to keep using the erroneous terminology of “sharing.” Worse yet, 
that terminology may be disguising labor trends that are of significant concern, 
keeping those issues from receiving due attention. To have a full and fair 
conversation about these issues and the future world of work that we want, we 
should leave the misleading rhetoric behind. 
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